

# DONOR DIVERSITY THROUGH PUBLIC MATCHING FUNDS

Elisabeth Genn    Michael J. Malbin  
Sundeep Iyer     Brendan Glavin

BRENNAN  
CENTER  
FOR JUSTICE

*at New York University School of Law*

CFI  
— THE  
CAMPAIGN  
FINANCE  
INSTITUTE  
—

## ABOUT THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE

The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law is a non-partisan public policy and law institute that focuses on the fundamental issues of democracy and justice. Our work ranges from voting rights to campaign finance reform, from racial justice in criminal law to Constitutional protection in the fight against terrorism. A singular institution — part think tank, part public interest law firm, part advocacy group — the Brennan Center combines scholarship, legislative and legal advocacy, and communications to win meaningful, measurable change in the public sector.

## ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE

The Campaign Finance Institute has been the nation's pre-eminent non-partisan research institute on campaign finance since it was founded in 1999. Statements of the Campaign Finance Institute, its Task Forces and scholars do not necessarily reflect the views of CFI's Trustees or financial supporters. Additional information about the Institute may be found on its website, [www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org](http://www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org).

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Campaign Finance Institute thanks the National Institute on Money in State Politics for the state campaign finance records used in this report and the New York City Campaign Finance Board for the data on city elections. It thanks the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and Smith Richardson Foundation for their generous financial support of this work.

The Brennan Center thanks colleagues Lawrence Norden and Mark Ladov for their invaluable input throughout the drafting process, legal intern Matthew Ladd for his assistance with interviews of elected officials, and current and former Brennan Center research associates Jonathan Backer, Lianna Reagan, and Nabanita Pal for their feedback at the early stages of this project. This report also benefited greatly from the insights of Fritz Schwarz and Michael Waldman as well as the thoughtful and thorough editorial assistance of Desiree Ramos Reiner, Erik Opsal, and Madeline Friedman.

The Brennan Center gratefully acknowledges the Democracy Alliance Partners, Ford Foundation, The Joyce Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Foundations, The Overbrook Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Wallace Global Fund for their generous support of our money in politics work.

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Elisabeth Genn** serves as Counsel for the Brennan Center's Democracy Program. Prior to joining the Brennan Center, Ms. Genn worked on systemic issues in the provision of public benefits to low income New Yorkers at the New York Legal Assistance Group and as a litigation associate at Jenner & Block LLP, where she was the recipient of the Albert E. Jenner Pro Bono Award for 2009. Ms. Genn received her J.D. in 2006 from New York University School of Law, graduating Order of the Coif and receiving the George P. Foulk Memorial Award for Outstanding Sincerity and Distinguished Scholarship. From 2006-2007, Ms. Genn served as a law clerk to the Honorable Colleen McMahon on the Southern District of New York. Prior to attending law school, Ms. Genn worked as an Assistant and then Associate Editor at Foreign Affairs magazine. She received her B.A. *summa cum laude* and Phi Beta Kappa from Columbia University in English and Political Science.

**Sundeep Iyer** is the Principal Quantitative Analyst at the Brennan Center for Justice. He provides statistical and geographic analysis across a range of the Center's programmatic areas, with expertise in empirical analysis of voting rights, money in politics, and redistricting issues. His statistical estimates have been cited by media outlets across the country. From June 2011 to April 2012, Mr. Iyer was a Fellow with the Brennan Center, providing statistical analysis for the Center's Democracy Program. Mr. Iyer received his A.B. *summa cum laude* from Harvard College. He was awarded the Gerda Richards Crosby Prize, given annually to the College's most outstanding graduate in the Government department. For his research on voting, he also received Harvard University's Thomas Temple Hoopes Prize.

**Michael J. Malbin** is co-founder and Executive Director of the Campaign Finance Institute, as well as a Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany. One of the country's leading scholars in this field, Dr. Malbin has been writing extensively about money and politics for more than three decades. Co-authored books include *Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics* (2003); *The Election after Reform: Money, Politics and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act* (2006) and *Vital Statistics on Congress* (2012 edition forthcoming). With others at CFI, he has been doing extensive work for several years on the role of small donors in federal, state and local elections. Recent co-authored publications on that subject include *Reform in an Age of Networked Campaigns: How to Foster Citizen Participation through Small Donors and Volunteers* (2010); *Changing the Game by Expanding the Playing Field – Public Financing of Elections after Citizens United and Arizona Free Enterprise: An Analysis of Six Midwestern States Based on the Elections of 2006-2010* (2011), and *Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States* (Election Law Journal, 2012).

**Brendan Glavin** is the Data and Systems Manager at the Campaign Finance Institute. With CFI since 2001, he coordinates, develops and maintains CFI's federal and state databases on candidates, political parties, contributors, and the ever-changing variety of non-party organizations. He also provides all technical support for CFI's business systems and website. Previously, he coordinated technology for the Character Education Partnership and was Assistant to the Field Director at the Concord Coalition. He is co-author of *Changing the Game by Expanding the Playing Field – Public Financing of Elections after Citizens United and Arizona Free Enterprise: An Analysis of Six Midwestern States Based on the Elections of 2006-2010* (2011), and *Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States* (Election Law Journal, 2012).

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>I. Introduction</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>II. Report Methodology and Limitations</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>III. Citywide Comparison: New York City Council Donors and State Assembly Donors</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>IV. New York City Donors: Diversity in Detail</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>V. Select Neighborhoods: A Detailed Analysis of Small Donor Participation in Low-Income Communities and Communities of Color</b>	<b>16</b>
A. Brooklyn: Bedford-Stuyvesant and Surrounding Neighborhoods	16
B. Chinatown and Surrounding Neighborhoods	18
C. Upper Manhattan and the Bronx	20
<b>Appendix A: Demographic Maps</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Appendix B: Diversity Among New York State Senate and Gubernatorial Donors</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Endnotes</b>	<b>26</b>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

New York State is considering a system of public campaign financing for state elections similar to New York City's small donor matching fund program. The city's system matches at a six-to-one ratio the first \$175 a city resident contributes to a candidate participating in the voluntary program. In endorsing a reform for the state that mirrors the city system, New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo claimed that a multiple-match public financing system would bring greater equality to state elections.

Candidates who have participated in both New York City and New York State elections agree. They have told us that by pumping up the value of small contributions, the New York City system gives them an incentive to reach out to their own constituents rather than focusing all their attention on wealthy out-of-district donors, leading them to attract more diverse donors into the political process. This is markedly different, they explained, from how they and other candidates conduct campaigns at the state level.

These claims, if true, suggest that the city's public financing system has contributed to a fundamental change in the relationship between candidates and their donors in New York City. In this new joint study, we analyze data on donations to candidates in New York City in the most recent sets of elections at the city and state levels to see whether the data are consistent with these claims — in other words, whether greater participation by small donors in city elections translates into more diverse participation.

The results for the elections we analyzed are remarkable. Small donors to 2009 City Council candidates came from a much broader array of city neighborhoods than did the city's small donors to 2010 State Assembly candidates.

- Almost 90 percent of the city's census block groups were home to someone — and often, many people — who gave \$175 or less to a City Council candidate in 2009. By contrast, the small donors in the 2010 State Assembly elections came from only 30 percent of the city's census block groups.
- The neighborhoods in which City Council small donors reside are more representative of New York City as a whole. They have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, and higher concentrations of minority residents than the neighborhoods where State Assembly small donors reside. All of these differences are statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ).
- Small donor participation in some of the city's poor black, Asian, and Latino neighborhoods was far more robust in City Council contests. *Twenty-four times more small donors from the poor and predominately black Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood and the surrounding communities gave money to candidates for the City Council than for the State Assembly. For Chinatown the advantage was 23 to 1. In the heavily Latino neighborhoods of Upper Manhattan and the Bronx, it was 12 to 1.*<sup>1</sup> The data support the claim that small donor matching funds help bring participants into the political process who traditionally are less likely to be active.

- The poor neighborhoods of color we analyzed were also financially more important to City Council candidates than to State Assembly candidates. In financial terms, the donors from Bedford-Stuyvesant and surrounding neighborhoods were more than 11 times as important for City Council candidates as they were than for candidates running for State Assembly. For Chinatown, the figure was 7 to 1. Contributors from Upper Manhattan and the Bronx were more than three times as important in City Council elections.

We do not discount the relevance of other factors, such as term limits for City Council and city residents' greater engagement in city elections, that may lead to greater diversity of participation in the City Council context. But available evidence — documented in the Methodology and Limitations section of this report — suggests that New York City's public financing system plays a significant role in bringing about the striking results we found.

Ultimately, our data are consistent with the claims made by candidates who have run in both city and state elections. The city's public financing system gives candidates an incentive to reach out to a broader and more diverse array of constituents to fund their campaigns. In so doing, the city's public financing system appears to have achieved one of its key goals — strengthening the connections between public officials and their constituents.

## I. INTRODUCTION

New York State is considering a system of public campaign financing for state elections similar to the one New York City uses for municipal elections. In that system, the city puts up six dollars in public matching funds for each of the first \$175 that a city resident contributes to a candidate participating in the voluntary program.

One of the key purposes of the city's matching fund program is to strengthen the connections between public officials and their constituents by bringing more small donors into the process and making them more important to the candidates' campaigns. A previous paper by the Campaign Finance Institute showed that matching funds heighten the number and role of small donors in city elections and would be likely to do the same at the state level.<sup>2</sup> But this only begins to tell us whether matching funds make the system more representative. We also want to know whether the new donors are similar to previous ones, or whether public financing changes the mix of who contributes. For example, does a greater role for small donors mean more participation by minorities, or by donors who are lower down on the economic ladder?

In recent interviews conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice, legislators and candidates said the city's matching funds led them to look to a more diverse set of donors. According to Jose M. Serrano, a member of the New York State Senate who once served on the City Council:

I'm in a community, the south Bronx, where there aren't a lot of people with great personal wealth. This is a working class community, and my neighbors can't drop \$1,000. But being able to raise \$10, and with the match being so significant, really made these small donors very important. It not only empowered me, but it empowered the community as well. So public campaign financing empowers communities as well as candidates... Once I ran for the Senate, it was extremely different... I was taking on a very well-financed candidate. My campaign was raising money, but we knew we couldn't raise as much from local people because we weren't getting matches. As a result, we started seeing more high-dollar fundraisers.

Eric Adams, a New York State Senator who is now running for city office, echoed this view:

On the state level, I'm targeting people who are in politics, either as lobbyists or unions or corporations... If I reach out to a lobbyist, I may be able to get a \$2,000 check in comparison to reaching out to a single person who could only write a \$50 or a \$100 check. So the bulk of my time would probably go to those professionals in the business of politics... It's just the opposite in the city. In the borough president race that I'm now embarking on, most of my calls are to small donors: everyday people. And a large number of people who contribute to my campaign have never contributed to a campaign before; have never really participated in politics.<sup>3</sup>

These interviews tell an important story: the incentives built into New York City's public financing program shifted the way these politicians went about their business. Their testimony shows how they looked for new people to participate in their campaigns and that the participants were more diverse than traditional donors. And tellingly, they are saying that they behaved differently as candidates when they ran for city office, with its matching fund public financing system, than when they ran for a New York State office without it.

This joint study by the Brennan Center for Justice and the Campaign Finance Institute tests whether these powerful but anecdotal claims are supported by the available evidence from the most recent state and municipal elections. To do so, we compared donors to candidates in the City Council elections of 2009, where there was a public financing program, to the donors to candidates in the State Assembly elections of 2010, where there was no such program. We compared the City Council and State Assembly races because those electoral districts are similar in size and because doing so allowed us to look at the giving patterns of the same city residents in different elections.

The results are striking. We find that small donors to 2009 City Council candidates (who gave a total of \$175 or less to a candidate) came from a much broader range of neighborhoods than small donors to 2010 State Assembly candidates. Small donors who gave money to a City Council candidate came from 89 percent of the city's census block groups (CBGs). By contrast, the small donors in the State Assembly elections came from only 30 percent of the city's CBGs. Almost everyone in the city, from the richest of neighborhoods to the poorest, lived within a city block or so of someone who contributed to the 2009 City Council elections. The donors looked and lived like the neighbors in everyone's neighborhoods, because they came from literally all over the city. This was not even close to being true for the donors in the 2010 New York State Assembly elections. Nor was it true for other state-level offices.

To be sure, we only compared donor participation patterns in one election cycle for City Council and one for the State Assembly. It remains hard to isolate the role of the city's public financing program in creating these very different levels and kinds of donor participation at the city and state levels. Other factors, such as term limits and the potentially greater engagement of city residents in city elections, also play a role. But as subsequent sections of this report demonstrate, strong evidence suggests that the city's public financing program is an important part of the explanation for the differences in the state and city donor profiles.

It makes sense that more small donors — from a more diverse set of communities — participated under the city's system in 2009. Matching funds give city candidates an incentive to look actively for small contributions. In addition, the city requires candidates who take public funds to raise a threshold number of contributions within their own constituencies. As a result, the donors who gave to City Council candidates in 2009 came from a broader swath of less wealthy and more racially diverse neighborhoods than did the donors to candidates for the State Assembly in 2010. The anecdotal claims that politicians have made about New York City's matching funds thus seem to be consistent with our data. The matching funds appear to bring more donors into the system from a more diverse set of neighborhoods, making the pool of donors more representative of the population as a whole.



## II. REPORT METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Earlier, we used the words “neighborhood” and “census block group” (CBG) as if they were interchangeable. However, in our general understanding, a neighborhood is quite a bit larger than a CBG — a geographic unit created by the U.S. Census Bureau. According to the Census Bureau, a block group “will generally contain between 600 and 3,000 people ... with an optimal size of 1,500.”<sup>4</sup>

To allow like-to-like comparisons, we primarily compare the CBGs of city donors who gave to candidates for City Council, which has a matching fund program, to the CBGs of city donors who gave to candidates for State Assembly, which does not. By limiting our coverage to block groups within the city for both sets of elections, we control for the demographic and political characteristics of the potential donor pool. We compare these two elected offices because the size of their constituencies is about the same. For additional comparison, we also include tables in the Appendix for city residents who give to candidates for other state offices.

To assign donors to CBGs we used a vendor, Aristotle International, to pinpoint the donors’ locations from their addresses in campaign finance disclosure files. However, we used a donor’s contribution for the CBG calculations only if we were confident that the address was residential. Because the city’s reporting rules require donors to provide a residential address, while state law permits an employment address, this meant setting aside more state donors’ contributions (30 percent) than city contributions (10 percent). This explains some of the density differences in our maps, but not enough to alter the fundamental conclusions. The neighborhood discussions later in this paper use an estimation procedure, explained in the footnotes, to correct for this difference.

Before embarking on our substantive analysis, we should note that this study is not without limitations. First, we note that there are no available data on the income, race, or education of individual donors. The findings in this paper are therefore about the CBGs within which donors reside and the clear differences between the CBGs from which the candidates running for the two offices are drawing their donors. Given the small size of a CBG, however, their demographic characteristics speak clearly to the everyday surroundings of the individual donor.

In addition, we recognize that it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the value of public financing for donor diversity from just one set of elections. However, the available data on previous elections — especially in the City Council context — give us no reason to believe that the results would be substantially different if we had compared other elections instead.<sup>5</sup>

One small part of the explanation for differences in donor participation between the 2009 City Council and 2010 State Assembly is sheer quantity. The 2009 City Council candidates raised \$12.9 million in private contributions, while 2010 State Assembly candidates from the city’s Assembly districts raised \$9.3 million. If the Assembly candidates had also raised \$12.9 million, some of that additional money presumably would have come from small

donors — but probably not much. Donors who gave \$175 or less to State Assembly races accounted for less than 6 percent of those candidates' total funds. By contrast, 2009 City Council candidates raised about 30 percent of their private money from such donors.

Other substantive differences between City Council and State Assembly elections might have a noticeable effect on our data. For example, there are term limits for City Council but not for State Assembly. City residents may also simply be more engaged in city elections. At the same time, however, prior findings give us comfort that the city's public financing program is an important part of the explanation for the difference between the state and city donor profiles.

As a recent Campaign Finance Institute study highlighted, candidates who did not participate in the public financing system in the 2009 City Council elections raised only 15 percent of their private money from donors who gave \$250 or less. For participating candidates that figure was 37 percent. In other words, participating candidates raised two-and-a-half times as much of their private money from small donors as did non-participating candidates, even before we include public matching funds.<sup>6</sup> Although non-participating City Council candidates raised more money from small donors (15 percent) than State Assembly candidates (6 percent), the substantial difference between participating and non-participating City Council candidates cannot be explained by factors that distinguish city from state elections. The difference seems most logically attributable to changes in candidate and small donor behavior under the city's public financing system.

Due to the absence of data from the pre-public financing era in the city, we cannot know whether participation rates for city elections were ever precisely the same as they are now for state elections.<sup>7</sup> A look at small donor participation under the city system in 1997—when there was a one-to-one public financing match in place—and then again in 2009, however, suggests that small donor participation rates in city elections might have looked more like participation rates now do for the state. As a prior Brennan Center study found, small donor participation was 40 percent greater in 2009 than in 1997, the last election before the single match system transitioned to a multiple match system.<sup>8</sup> In other words, before the adoption of the multiple-match system, City Council small donor participation rates were lower than they are now.

Finally, we note that people do not modify their behavior overnight in response to changed incentives. Therefore, this study does not pinpoint exactly what donor giving in state elections would look like with a public financing system in place. Instead, we consider whether the available data on recent elections is consistent with the notion that such a system could help the state realize some of the diversity benefits the city has seen from increased small donor participation.

### III. CITYWIDE COMPARISON: NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL DONORS AND STATE ASSEMBLY DONORS

The following data, and the maps that illustrate it, compare small donor participation by New York City residents in 2010 New York State Assembly races to New York City residents' participation in 2009 New York City Council races. The differences between these two sets of contests suggest there is a significant connection between the public financing system for municipal elections, which amplifies the impact of small donors, and political participation from a broader and more diverse array of neighborhoods and communities.

As Table 1 shows, candidates for the City Council in 2009 raised small contributions from donors who lived in 89 percent of the city's CBGs. By contrast, candidates who ran for the State Assembly in 2010 received small donor support from only 30 percent of the city's CBGs. Moreover, small donors to the gubernatorial and State Senate races came from even fewer CBGs than did the small donors to State Assembly candidates.

Office and Election Year	Percent of CBG's with Donors Whose Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To ...		
	\$1-175	\$176-\$999	\$1000 or more
City Council candidates, 2009	89%	43%	11%
State Assembly candidates, 2010	30%	17%	6%
State Senate candidates, 2010	25%	15%	7%
Gubernatorial candidates, 2010	11%	7%	7%
All Statewide and State Legislative candidates combined, 2010	43%	26%	13%

Table 1. Percentage Of CBGs In New York City With Donors Giving Varying Amounts To Candidates For 2009 New York City Council And Various 2010 New York State Offices.

**Donors Mapped, Citywide:** Standing alone, small donor participation from 89 percent of the city's CBGs is impressive enough. But the greater inclusiveness of New York City's public financing system becomes even more apparent from maps showing the geographic distribution of the city's small and large donors.

Figures 1 and 2 show in red those CBGs where there is at least one donor who gave \$1,000 or more to a State Assembly candidate or a City Council candidate, respectively. The maps resemble what one would see for most elections in other cities and states. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the geographic coverage is spotty for both elections: just 11 percent of CBGs in the City Council context, and just 6 percent in the State Assembly context, are home to a donor who gave \$1,000 or more. Most of the large donors in New York City come from neighborhoods in Manhattan, especially the Upper East and Upper West Side, and from Staten Island. These neighborhoods not only have low levels of poverty but are known for their greater affluence.




Figure 1 (left): CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving \$1,000 Or More To New York State Assembly Candidate, 2010; Figure 2 (right): CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving \$1,000 Or More To New York City Council Candidate, 2009.

The next maps, Figures 3 and 4 below, show in red participation by *small donors* — those who gave a total of \$175 or less — to State Assembly and to City Council candidates, respectively. The Campaign Finance Institute’s analysis of donor records in all 50 states has shown that in most elections more people give small contributions than give large ones even though they do not provide the bulk of the money financing campaigns.<sup>9</sup> As a result, it is no surprise to see that Figure 3 (mapping CBGs with small donors in 2010 State Assembly races) is more broadly populated than Figures 1 and 2 (mapping CBGs with large donors).




Figure 3: CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving \$175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidate, 2010.

The CBGs colored in red in Figure 3 represent 30 percent of the city’s total CBGs. While 30 percent is not trivial, it still leaves large swaths of Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx entirely off the map of State Assembly donors. And the Assembly’s 30 percent does not compare to the 89 percent of CBGs that are home to small donors who gave to City Council candidates. Comparing Figure 3 with Figure 4 illustrates the point dramatically.




Figure 4: CBGs In New York City With At Least One Donor Giving \$175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidate, 2009.

Of course, the patterns in Figures 3 and 4 leave open the possibility that just one or a handful of residents in each CBG account for the breadth of geographic representation among small donors. In fact, this is true for the State Assembly contests, but not the City Council ones. The following maps, Figures 5 and 6, show the number of small donors in each CBG. Figure 5 shows that the overwhelming majority of CBGs with small donors who contributed to State Assembly races only had between 1 and 5 such donors. Indeed, only 2 percent of CBGs in New York City were home to more than five small donors to a 2010 State Assembly race. Over half of the CBGs with any small donors contributing to a State Assembly race had only one such small donor.




Figure 5: Number Of Donors In New York City Giving \$175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates In 2010, By CBG.

By contrast, Figure 6, which displays the numbers of small donors contributing to City Council races, shows not 1 to 5 small donors in the typical CBG, but 6 to 25 such donors or more. Indeed, City Council contests boast 20 times more CBGs with more than five donors than State Assembly contests have. Moreover, CBGs with a small donor presence were about four times as likely to have only one small donor in the State Assembly context as in the City Council context.




Figure 6: Number Of Donors In New York City Giving \$175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG.

In short, Table 1 and the maps above show that candidates for City Council are searching for and finding small donors in every corner of the city. And the fact that they are finding multiple donors in most of these neighborhoods suggests this is not just a collection of random events, but rather a reflection of the incentives the city's public financing system provides to candidates to reach out to their own constituents for support. In other words, the citywide evidence reflects the anecdotal experience the candidates described.

## IV. NEW YORK CITY DONORS: DIVERSITY IN DETAIL

City Council candidates are looking all over the city for their small contributions, while State Assembly candidates are not. This is bound to have an effect on the overall diversity of each donor pool. Table 2 makes clear the greater diversity small donors bring into City Council elections by comparing the demographic characteristics of neighborhoods in which small donors live to those in which large donors live at both the City Council and State Assembly levels.

Characteristics of the block groups	Block Groups with Donors Whose Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To ...		
	\$1-175	\$176-\$999	\$1000 or more
Median Household Income 1999, CBGs w donors (Entire city: \$38,293)			
City Council	\$43,754	\$58,551	\$70,798
Assembly	\$49,973	\$57,452	\$66,255
Poverty % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 21%)			
City Council	19%	13%	11%
Assembly	16%	13%	12%
Non-white % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 55%)			
City Council	54%	35%	25%
Assembly	39%	30%	21%
Education: % not completing high school (Entire city: 28%)			
City Council	26%	18%	14%
Assembly	22%	18%	14%
Education: % with Bachelor's degree or beyond (Entire city: 27%)			
City Council	30%	44%	52%
Assembly	36%	43%	51%

Table 2: Comparing Demographic Features Of CBGs With Donors Giving At Varying Levels To Candidates For New York City Council (2009) And New York State Assembly (2010).<sup>10</sup>

A comparison across the three columns in Table 2 shows that both within City Council and State Assembly races, small donors come from CBGs with lower median household incomes, higher non-white populations, higher levels of poverty, and lower levels of education than those of larger donors. But when we compare the Council to the Assembly, the City Council's small-donor CBGs have lower incomes, higher poverty rates, higher percentages of minority residents, and lower levels of education than the Assembly's small-donor CBGs. All of these differences are statistically significant ( $p < .01$ ). The figures for minority participation are especially striking.

National surveys repeatedly have shown donors disproportionately to be white.<sup>11</sup> This remains true of the CBGs in which the Assembly’s small donors reside. But, remarkably, the donors to City Council candidates came from CBGs whose non-white population percentage (54 percent) is almost the same as the whole city’s (55 percent).

The fact that small donors to City Council contests reside in communities as diverse as the city itself traces back to the same matching fund incentives — and the requirements for a minimum number of in-district donors — that lead City Council candidates to raise small-donor contributions from their own constituents in the first place. To illustrate the diversity of the donors’ neighborhoods more clearly, Figure 7 shows the level of poverty across New York City. The more saturated the shading for the census tracts in this map, the higher the percentage of adult residents living below the federal poverty line.




Figure 7 (left): Poverty rate In New York City, Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract; Figure 6 (right, and page 13 above): Number of Donors In New York City Giving \$175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG.

Figure 7 shows that there are large clusters of high-poverty tracts in the Bronx and Brooklyn, in particular. A quick comparison with Figure 6 — the map illustrating the numbers of small donors participating in New York City Council contests — shows that even in these high-poverty areas, there are substantial numbers of small donors contributing to City Council candidates. Viewed in conjunction with the preceding maps, particularly Figures 3 and 5, which show the far lower levels of participation in State Assembly races, Figure 7 affirms the value of the City Council public financing system in bringing all New Yorkers, including those who live in high-poverty communities, into the political process.

The demographic maps of the city in Appendix A underscore the point further. Viewed in conjunction with Figure 7 — the map showing poverty rates across New York City — they illustrate that the city’s poorer black, Latino, and Asian residents live in largely segregated communities. Yet Figures 4 and 6 above show significant participation by New Yorkers from all of these communities in New York City races under the public financing system, participation that does not exist in elections for State office, as shown above in Figures 3 and 5.



## V. SELECT NEIGHBORHOODS: A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SMALL DONOR PARTICIPATION IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR

The benefits of New York City’s public financing system in enhancing diversity in the political process become even more apparent on closer examination of small donor contributions from the city’s low-income and minority communities. The sets of maps below analyze and illustrate small donor participation in State Assembly and City Council contests by residents of predominantly minority and high-poverty communities in Brooklyn, Chinatown, and Upper Manhattan and the Bronx. These maps illustrate the far greater small donor participation from low-income and minority neighborhoods under the city’s public financing system than in New York State Assembly contests.

### A. Brooklyn: Bedford-Stuyvesant and Surrounding Neighborhoods

Figure 8 shows the number of donors giving \$175 or less to a State Assembly candidate in each CBG in Bedford-Stuyvesant, a predominantly black and low-income neighborhood in Brooklyn, and surrounding communities (see Figures 10 and 11 below). There were only an estimated 331 small donors to Assembly candidates from all of these 983 block groups combined. In areas represented in off-white on the map, there were no small donors. Just one CBG on this map is home to more than five small donors, and only seven CBGs are home to more than two.

By contrast, there were an estimated 7,987 small donors to City Council candidates from the same CBGs. The difference is remarkable and is visually striking in Figure 9. *Twenty-four times* as many small donors from these neighborhoods gave to City Council as to Assembly candidates. Even if we adjust for the fact that Assembly candidates raised less money overall than City Council candidates, there still were nearly 17 times more small donors from these neighborhoods’ CBGs to City Council than to Assembly candidates.

This part of Brooklyn includes the district of **State Senator Eric Adams**, who is now running for city office under the public financing system. He told us: “At the city level . . . people are doing small house parties with small donations from \$25 to \$10 to \$50. That is unheard of at the state level, where you are looking for larger contributions. It’s an entirely different energy around raising money. If you’re writing me a \$10 or \$25 check because . . . you don’t have a great deal of money, then that contribution is important to you . . . you’re going to want to know what type of person I am, because that \$25 is harder to come by. So people have come out, started to volunteer, and started to participate. There’s a relationship they’re developing with the person they’re making the contribution to. I have a large number of first-time donors, and those first-time donors have also turned into first-time participants in the process . . .”




Figure 8: Number Of Donors Giving \$175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates in 2010, By CBG, in Bedford-Stuyvesant And Surrounding Communities In Brooklyn.




Figure 9: Number Of Donors Giving \$175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG, In Bedford-Stuyvesant And Surrounding Communities In Brooklyn.

It is particularly instructive to look at these districts from the candidates' perspectives by considering how important the CBGs' money was to the candidates' overall campaign funds. State Assembly candidates received just \$87,000 from these block groups. Although the block groups comprised 17 percent of the block groups in the city, they provided barely 1 percent of the money that Assembly candidates raised from city residents.<sup>12</sup> By contrast, City Council candidates received \$637,000 in private funds from these CBGs, comprising 5.4 percent of the individual private contributions raised by City Council candidates in 2009.<sup>13</sup> When public matching funds are included, the block groups were responsible for about \$2.5 million, which in turn amounted to nearly 11 percent of all of the combined money that City Council candidates raised in 2009.<sup>14</sup> In other words, **the proportional importance of contributions from Bedford-Stuyvesant and surrounding communities was about 11 times greater in the City Council elections of 2009 than in the elections for State Assembly in 2010.**

When viewed alongside Figure 9, Figures 10 and 11 confirm the value of the city's public financing system in increasing the diversity of neighborhoods participating financially in city elections. Even in the block groups with the highest concentrations of residents living in poverty and the highest concentrations of black residents, there are many small donations to City Council candidates.




Figure 10 (left): Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Black, By 2010 CBG, In Bedford-Stuyvesant And Surrounding Communities In Brooklyn; Figure 11 (right): Poverty Rate Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract, In Bedford-Stuyvesant And Surrounding Communities In Brooklyn.

## B. Chinatown and Surrounding Neighborhoods

Figure 12 shows the number of donors giving \$175 or less to a State Assembly candidate in each of the 72 CBGs in Chinatown and surrounding neighborhoods, areas with a high concentration of Asian residents and residents living in poverty (see Figures 14 and 15 below). As Figure 12 demonstrates, there were very few small donors in the State Assembly contests in these neighborhoods: an estimated 40 such donors reside in the small set of CBGs pictured. No CBG on this map is home to more than six small donors to Assembly candidates. Indeed, only three of the block groups shaded in blue are home to more than two small donors. By contrast (see Figure 13) Chinatown and surrounding neighborhoods supplied an estimated 932 small donors to candidates for City Council. This was more than 23 times the number of small donors who gave to candidates running for the Assembly.




Figure 12: Number Of Donors Giving \$175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates In 2010, By CBG, In Chinatown And Surrounding Communities.



Figure 13: Number Of Donors Giving \$175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG, In Chinatown And Surrounding Communities.

The neighborhoods' donors were also more financially significant to candidates for City Council elections than to candidates for the State Assembly. New York City Council candidates received \$122,000 in private individual donations from the block groups pictured in Figure 13. This was 1 percent of the total private individual funding

raised by City Council candidates citywide.<sup>15</sup> When public funds are included, the neighborhoods' residents were responsible for \$407,000 of the Council candidates' funds. This represents 1.8 percent of all the public and private money the Council raised for the elections of 2009.<sup>16</sup> By contrast, State Assembly candidates received just \$21,076 from these block groups, amounting to only 0.2 percent of all money candidates raised from New York City residents in State Assembly contests.<sup>17</sup> In other words, **the importance of contributions from Chinatown and the surrounding communities was about eight times as great in the City Council elections of 2009 as in the State Assembly elections of 2010.**

Figures 14 and 15 illustrate the value of the city's public financing system in increasing small donor participation from these predominantly low-income and minority communities in city elections. Even in the block groups with the highest concentrations of poverty and the highest concentrations of Asian residents, there are still many small donations to City Council candidates from Chinatown and the surrounding neighborhoods.




Figure 14 (left): Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Asian, By 2010 CBG, In Chinatown And Surrounding Communities.  
 Figure 15 (right): Poverty Rate Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract, In Chinatown And Surrounding Communities.

### C. Upper Manhattan and the Bronx

Figure 16 is a map of 1,067 CBGs in the Bronx and Upper Manhattan. These CBGs, almost 19 percent of the CBGs in the city, are predominantly Latino and have large concentrations of residents living in poverty (see Figures 18 and 19). Only an estimated 644 of these neighborhoods' residents gave \$175 or less to a candidate for the Assembly in 2010, and only six of the CBGs are home to more than five small donors. By contrast, Figure 17 shows that many more of these neighborhoods' residents contributed to candidates for the City Council in 2009. We estimate that there were 7,480 small donors to City Council candidates from these CBGs, which is about 12 times the number of small donors from these CBGs to candidates for the State Assembly.




Figure 16: Number Of Donors Giving \$175 Or Less To New York State Assembly Candidates In 2010, by CBG, In The Bronx And Upper Manhattan.




Figure 17: Number Of Donors Giving \$175 Or Less To New York City Council Candidates In 2009, By CBG, In The Bronx And Upper Manhattan.

Putting these numbers in the context of total contributions received in the city and state races makes clear how New York City’s public financing system amplifies the significance of small donors. State Assembly candidates raised \$288,000 in all private contributions from these block groups; this amounted to just 3.2 percent of all the money that the city’s candidates for the Assembly raised from New York City residents.<sup>18</sup> By contrast, New York City Council candidates received \$727,000 in private individual contributions from the same set of block groups, comprising 6.2 percent of the total private individual contributions made to all City Council candidates in New York City.<sup>19</sup> When public matching funds are included, City Council candidates received \$2,638,000 from these block groups; this was 11.5 percent of all public and private money candidates raised in City Council contests in 2009.<sup>20</sup> In other words, **the block groups displayed in Figures 16 and 17 were more than three times as financially important in the City Council elections of 2009 as in the State Assembly elections of 2010.**

The neighborhoods pictured include the State Senate district of **Senator Jose M. Serrano** (quoted earlier) who said: “With the city’s program, you can actually throw fundraisers where you invite community residents instead of lobbyists and corporate types . . . So I would have small fundraisers in local restaurants, house parties became more significant . . . And when you do it this way, you start noticing that these small donations start piling up . . . Smaller campaign donations increase your pool of donors significantly, and you end up with hundreds of small donors who you can also reach out to. It creates a grassroots situation where the person may only give \$10 or \$50, but then he or she is also able to feel like an actual part of the campaign, and to feel that it’s not an ivory tower campaign. So it increases donor and volunteer engagement at an organic level. Without the match, fundraising becomes all-encompassing. You’re doing it all the time. I’ve found that when I was running for the Senate, we had to focus much more on fundraising and call time.”

Figures 18 and 19 underscore how the city’s public financing system increases the diversity of neighborhoods participating in city elections. These maps show that the Bronx and Upper Manhattan neighborhoods pictured are majority Latino and have extremely high poverty rates. Yet even in the block groups and neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of poverty and the highest concentrations of Latino residents, there are still many small donations to City Council candidates.



Figure 18 (left): Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Hispanic, By 2010 CBG, In The Bronx And Upper Manhattan; Figure 19 (right): Poverty Rate Among Voting-Age Residents, By 2010 Census Tract, In The Bronx And Upper Manhattan.

## APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHIC MAPS

This appendix provides a visual depiction of the concentrations of black, Latino, and Asian voting-age residents in New York City. More saturated areas on the maps indicate areas with higher concentrations of the relevant racial/ethnic group.

That New York City's housing patterns for poorer residents remain racially segregated has important implications for interpreting the maps in this report. The maps and data in this report can only demonstrate that donations are coming from more diverse neighborhoods. But because of continued racial and ethnic segregation in New York City, having a greater diversity of neighborhoods participate through small donor contributions likely translates directly into having a more diverse pool of donors.




Figure A.1: Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Black, By 2010 CBG.




Figure A.2: Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Hispanic, By 2010 CBG.






Figure A.3: Percentage Of Voting-Age Residents Who Are Asian, By 2010 CBG.

## APPENDIX B: DIVERSITY AMONG NEW YORK STATE SENATE AND GUBERNATORIAL DONORS

The tables below show the demographic characteristics of neighborhoods in which small donors to gubernatorial and State Senate candidates live. When compared to Table 2, they demonstrate that the neighborhoods in which small donors in the gubernatorial and State Senate elections reside are even less representative of the city's diversity than the neighborhoods in which State Assembly donors reside.

Characteristics of the Block Groups of Gubernatorial Donors	Block Groups with Donors Whose Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To ...		
	\$1-175	\$176-\$999	\$1000 or more
Median Household Income 1999, CBGs w donors (Entire city: \$38,293)	\$57,588	\$73,758	\$76,096
Poverty % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 21%)	13%	9%	10%
Non-white % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 55%)	28%	18%	17%
Education: % not completing high school (Entire city: 28%)	16%	9%	9%
Education: % with Bachelor's degree or beyond (Entire city: 27%)	45%	62%	64%

Table B.1: Demographic Features Of CBGs With Donors At Varying Levels To Candidates For New York Governor (2010).

Characteristics of the Block Groups of State Senate Donors	Block Groups with Donors Whose Contributions to a Candidate Aggregate To ...		
	\$1-175	\$176-\$999	\$1000 or more
Median Household Income 1999, CBGs w donors (Entire city: \$38,293)	\$49,893	\$58,582	\$69,263
Poverty % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 21%)	16%	14%	12%
Non-white % in CBGs with donors (Entire city: 55%)	43%	33%	21%
Education: % not completing high school (Entire city: 28%)	21%	17%	12%
Education: % with Bachelor's degree or beyond (Entire city: 27%)	37%	45%	55%

Table B.2: Demographic Features Of CBGs With Donors At Varying Levels To Candidates For State Senate (2010).

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Even if one adjusts for the fact that 2009 City Council candidates raised more money from private sources than 2010 Assembly candidates, there would still be an adjusted 17 to 1 advantage in the number of donors from Bedford Stuyvesant and surrounding neighborhoods giving to City Council over Assembly candidates, 16 to 1 for Chinatown donors, and 8 to 1 for donors from Upper Manhattan and lower Bronx.

<sup>2</sup> The study predicted that a similar program would increase the importance of small donors from only 6 percent of current state candidates' campaign funds to as much as 54 percent. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, PETER W. BRUSOE & BRENDAN GLAVIN, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. WHAT IS AND WHAT COULD BE: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SMALL-DONOR MATCHING FUNDS IN NEW YORK STATE ELECTIONS 4-6 (2012), available at [HTTP://WWW.CFINST.ORG/PDF/STATE/NY/CFI\\_IMPACT-MATCHING-ON-NYS.PDF](http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NY/CFI_IMPACT-MATCHING-ON-NYS.PDF) [HEREINAFTER MALBIN ET AL., WHAT IS AND WHAT COULD BE]; see also MICHAEL J. MALBIN, PETER W. BRUSOE & BRENDAN GLAVIN, *SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK CITY'S MATCHING FUNDS AS A MODEL FOR THE NATION AND STATES* IN 11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 7-16 (2012) [HEREINAFTER MALBIN ET AL., *SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY*].

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Jose M. Serrano, April 6, 2012. Interview with Eric Adams, April 12, 2012. Earlier interviews with candidates and public officials about the effects the city's matching fund system had on their fundraising practices may be found in ANGELA MIGALLY & SUSAN LISS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, *SMALL DONOR MATCHING FUNDS: THE NYC ELECTION EXPERIENCE* 4, 12-14, 18-20 (2010), available at [HTTP://BRENNAN.3CDN.NET/8116BE236784CC923F1AM6BENVW.PDF](http://brennan.3cdn.net/8116be236784cc923f1am6benvw.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, *CARTOGRAPHIC BOUNDARY FILES: CENSUS BLOCK GROUPS*, CENSUS.GOV, [HTTP://WWW.CENSUS.GOV/GEO/WWW/COB/BG\\_METADATA.HTML](http://www.census.gov/geo/www/COB/BG_METADATA.HTML) (LAST VISITED MAY 2, 2012, 3:32 PM).

<sup>5</sup> See MALBIN ET AL., *SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY*, *supra* note 2, at 8. It is not likely that our results would have been substantively different had we focused on a different state-level office instead. As Table 1 and the additional tables in Appendix B demonstrate, small donor participation in New York State Senate and gubernatorial races was even lower than at the State Assembly level.

<sup>6</sup> See MALBIN ET AL., *WHAT IS AND WHAT COULD BE*, *supra* note 2, at 3.

<sup>7</sup> It would be wrong to presume that donor participation rates in the city have grown linearly under the city's public financing system. Most notably, the number of small donors made its largest leap between 1997 and 2001, the first year in which New York City had instituted a multiple match. That substantial increase in small donor participation cannot be attributed solely to the multiple match, since 2001 was also a year in which an unprecedented number of candidates ran for a large number of open seats that were vacated by term limits. However, even 2005 — an election cycle with fewer open seats — saw a notable increase in small donor participation over 1997. Small donor participation rates in 2009 were higher still, even if they did not rise to the 2001 level. See MALBIN ET AL., *SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY*, *supra* note 2, at 8.

<sup>8</sup> See MIGALLY & LISS, *supra* note 3, at 12.

<sup>9</sup> The analysis of donors provides the underpinning for tables showing the percentage of each state's adult population that contributes to candidates, as well as CFI's estimates of the likely impact of a variety of policy changes in each state. See CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., *INTERACTIVE TOOL FOR CITIZEN POLICY ANALYSTS*, CFINST.ORG, [HTTP://WWW.CFINST.ORG/STATE/CITIZENPOLICYTOOL.ASPX](http://www.cfinst.org/state/citizenpolicytool.aspx) (LAST VISITED MAY 3, 2012, 10:50 AM). See also MICHAEL J. MALBIN, & PETER BRUSOE, "SMALL DONORS, BIG DEMOCRACY: NEW YORK CITY'S MATCHING FUNDS AS A MODEL FOR THE NATION AND STATES", 30 (JULY 14, 2012) (WORKING PAPER), available at [HTTP://WWW.CFINST.ORG/PDF/STATE/NYC-AS-A-MODEL.PDF](http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-AS-A-MODEL.PDF) (indicating the percentage of the voting age population contributing to gubernatorial or state legislative candidates in 2006 and to N.Y.C. Elections in 2005 and 2009).

<sup>10</sup> For citywide figures, see NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, POPULATION DIVISION, NYC 2000: RESULTS FROM THE 2000 CENSUS—SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS [HTTP://WWW.NYC.GOV/HTML/DCP/PDF/CENSUS/SOCIOPP.PDF](http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/sociopp.pdf) (LAST VISITED MAY 2, 2012, 4:29 PM) AND U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, *PLACES OF 100,000 OR MORE POPULATION RANKED BY THE NUMBER OF WHITE ALONE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO*, RANKING TABLES FOR PLACES OF 100,000 OR MORE POPULATION BY RACE ALONE, RACE ALONE OR IN COMBINATION, AND TWO OR MORE RACES (PHC-T-16), available at [HTTP://WWW.CENSUS.GOV/POPULATION/WWW/CEN2000/BRIEFS/PHC-T16/TABLES/TAB01.PDF](http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t16/tables/tab01.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> See American National Election Studies, *Gave Money to a Political Campaign, 1952-2008: Percent Among Demographic Groups Who Responded*, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR, [HTTP://WWW.ELECTIONSTUDIES.ORG/NESGUIDE/2NDTABLE/T6B\\_5\\_2.HTM](http://www.electionstudies.org/nsguide/2ndtable/t6b_5_2.htm) (LAST VISITED MAY 3, 2012, 10:50 AM). See also SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, *VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS* 238 (HARVARD UNIV. PRESS 1995); PETER C. FRANCA, JOHN C. GREEN, PAUL S. HERRNSON, LYNDA W. POWER & CLYDE WILCOX, *THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS* 30 (COLUMBIA UNIV. PRESS, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> To obtain the percentage of total money raised in Assembly contests in 2010 that came from individual donors in these block groups, we follow these steps:

1. We total the private contributions in our database coming from these block groups.
2. We divide that quantity by 0.7. This estimate is meant to compensate for the fact that we were only able to verify the residential addresses of 70 percent of all private contributions in the city for Assembly candidates and some of these missing contributions could have come from these neighborhoods.
3. The quantity obtained in #2 above is then divided by the total funds by all candidates in Assembly contests in 2010.

<sup>13</sup> We estimate the total private funds received from these CBGs by dividing the sum of private funds in our donor dataset by 0.9. This estimate compensates for the fact that we were only able to verify the residential addresses of 90 percent of all private contributions in the city for City Council candidates, and some of the missing contributions could have come from these neighborhoods. Note that the adjustment is smaller for Council candidates than for Assembly candidates. Therefore, if the procedure introduces any bias into the calculation, it is likely to work counter to our expected finding.

<sup>14</sup> To obtain the percentage of total money raised in City Council contests in 2009 that came from individual donors in these block groups, we follow these steps:

1. We total the private contributions coming from these block groups.
2. We then calculate the maximum possible amount of public matching funds that candidates could have received as a result of these private contributions — in other words, the total amount that would be generated by the six-to-one match if there were no cap on the amount of public matching funds that candidates could receive. We multiply that maximum amount by 0.62, which represents the fraction of the maximum possible amount of public matching funds that the average candidate actually was given.
3. Adding together the private contributions and this reduced public funding total, we then divide that quantity by 0.9, for reasons explained in the previous footnote.
4. The quantity obtained in #3 above is then divided by the total public and private funds for candidates in New York City Council contests in 2009 (minus self-financing).

<sup>15</sup> See *supra* note 13.

<sup>16</sup> See *supra* note 14.

<sup>17</sup> See *supra* note 12.

<sup>18</sup> See *supra* note 12.

<sup>19</sup> See *supra* note 13.

<sup>20</sup> See *supra* note 14.

## NEW AND FORTHCOMING BRENNAN CENTER PUBLICATIONS

*Voting Law Changes in 2012*

Wendy R. Weiser and Lawrence Norden

*Democracy & Justice: Collected Writings, Volume V*

Brennan Center for Justice

*National Survey: Super PACs, Corruption, and Democracy*

Brennan Center for Justice

*Voter Registration Modernization: A National Reform Proposal*

Wendy R. Weiser and Jonathan Brater

*Design Deficiencies and Lost Votes*

Lawrence Norden and Sundeep Iyer

*Facing Foreclosure Alone: The Continuing Crisis in Legal Representation*

Nabanita Pal

For more information, please visit [www.brennancenter.org](http://www.brennancenter.org).

## NEW AND FORTHCOMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

*Independent Spending in the States before and after Citizens United*

Keith Hamm, Jaclyn Kettler and Michael J. Malbin

*Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States*

Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe and Brendan Glavin

*Small Donors, Large Donors and the Internet: The Case for Presidential Public Financing after Obama*

Michael J. Malbin

*The Need for an Integrated Vision of Parties and Candidates:*

*National Political Party Finances, 1999-2008*

Michael J. Malbin, Aaron Dusso, Gregory Fortelny and Brendan Glavin

*Reform in an Age of Networked Campaigns:*

*How to Foster Citizen Participation through Small Donors and Volunteers*

Anthony J. Corrado, Michael J. Malbin, Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein

*Rethinking the Campaign Finance Agenda*

Michael J. Malbin

For more information, please visit [www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org](http://www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org).

BRENNAN  
CENTER  
FOR JUSTICE

*at New York University School of Law*

161 Avenue of the Americas  
12th Floor  
New York, NY 10013  
[www.brennancenter.org](http://www.brennancenter.org)



1425 K Street NW  
Suite 350  
Washington, DC 20005  
[www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org](http://www.CampaignFinanceInstitute.org)